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CAN, DO, AND SHOULD LEGAL ENTITIES HAVE DIGNITY?: 
THE CASE OF THE STATE 
MAXWELL O. CHIBUNDU∗ 
Dignity is said to inhere in the idea of being human.  It might then be 
assumed that the inverse is impossible; that is, that non-human legal per-
sons are incapable of possessing dignity.1  However satisfying that might 
be, at least one influential member of the United States Supreme Court, in 
his recent opinions, has suggested otherwise.  Justice Kennedy has relied on 
the concept of dignity not only to affirm the transcendent value of according 
equal protection and due process rights to homosexuals,2 but he also has in-
voked the concept of dignity to explain why states may not be subjected to 
certain kinds of lawsuits.3  Many of those reading this Paper who instinc-
tively will applaud Justice Kennedy’s gay rights decisions will just as likely 
sneer at, if not find offensive, his clothing of the protections afforded corpo-
rate interests—including the state—in the garb of “dignity.”  For such crit-
ics, it is indisputably the case that legal entities, unlike natural persons, have 
no right to rely on claims of “dignity” to underpin whatever assertions of 
rights they may make.4  Indeed, for many, the ideas of “rights” and of “cor-
                                                          
© 2015 Maxwell O. Chibundu. 
∗ Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  These 
thoughts were prepared for the 2015 Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze.  I would like to ex-
press my appreciation to the other participants of the 2015 Maryland Constitutional Law 
Schmooze, especially its convener-in-chief, Professor Mark Graber, whom I have the privilege of 
calling a colleague.  I acknowledge with gratitude the very thoughtful critiques of another col-
league, Professor Peter Danchin.  My thanks also go to Yolanda Er Jia Chen, J.D. class of 2017, 
for her research assistance, and to the staff of the Maryland Law Review for editorial help.  All 
errors of course are mine.   
 1.  This assertion may be exaggerated.  There is of course an emerging claim for the “rights” 
and “dignity” of animals, especially of the “great apes.” Nothing said in this Paper is intended to 
address the topic of the extension of the idea of dignity or of rights to living organisms other than 
human beings and the institutions that we have fashioned to meet our needs. 
 2.  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 3.  See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 4.  Cf. Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Groups, ACTA JURIDICA 66 (2008) (“Michael Igna-
tieff said in his Tanner Lectures that dignity goes with individuality and that ‘there is no way 
round the individualism implicit in the idea of dignity.’”); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Elec-
tion Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 466–67 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corpora-
tions help structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their ‘personhood’ 
often serves as a useful legal fiction.  But they are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by 
whom and for whom our Constitution was established. . . .  Take away the ability to use general 
treasury funds for some of those ads, and no one’s autonomy, dignity, or political equality has 
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porate interests” are antithetical.  But beyond the emotive belief in the ex-
clusive attachment of dignity to human beings, what arguments exist for the 
claim that dignity is or should lie exclusively in the individual human per-
son?  Reflecting on this question is the undertaking of this Paper. 
I start by trying to tease out the meaning of dignity as it is invoked by 
those who see it as an elemental human attribute.  This requires the explora-
tion of the idea of dignity alongside that of another popularly claimed at-
tribute of humanity: the existence of “human rights.”  What interactions ex-
ist between these ideas, and what does the much more elaborated on 
concept of human rights tell us about the idea and meaning of dignity?  
Next, I explore whether the idea of dignity, as contextualized through hu-
man rights discourses, necessarily precludes its extension to other subjects 
of the legal order.  Although labor unions, professional associations and 
corporate entities are obvious subjects for study, my primary interest is in 
the dominant international political association of our age, the “state.”  At 
one level, the state may be viewed as the aggregation of the interests of its 
members, and the concept of dignity when applied to it may simply be the 
affirmation in a collective form of an attribute that belongs in fact to the in-
dividual human beings that make up the society. But the state also functions 
as more than the simple aggregation of the interests of its citizens and resi-
dents.  It is recognized as having an identity that is separate and distin-
guishable from those of its members.  Simply put, it is and has been treated 
as a legal person in its own right.  Does that recognition require that its sta-
tus be accorded the honor or legitimization value that is commonly associ-
ated with the idea of “dignity?” 
Finally, I offer some concluding thoughts on the significance of the 
idea of “state dignity” for the subject matter of this year’s Constitutional 
Law Schmooze: the “public/private” dichotomy in legal discourse. 
I.  THE MEANINGS OF DIGNITY 
Virtually anyone who has thought about the term dignity must, at the 
outset, own up to its amorphousness.5  Some of the ambiguities of thought 
                                                          
been impinged upon in the least.”).  As will be explained below, this skepticism as to the applica-
bility of the attribute of “dignity” beyond the human organism is at the heart of Kantian teachings 
about dignity.   
 5.  See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Introduction: Dignity and Its Discontents, in JEREMY 
WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK AND RIGHTS (The Berkeley Tanner Lectures) (2015); see also Leslie 
Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011) (noting that, as used 
by the United States Supreme Court, “dignity is not one concept . . . but rather five related con-
cepts”). 
Here, dignity is in excellent company.  Other terms, (and their related derivatives) such as 
liberty, equality, justice, fairness, due process, democracy, and indeed “rule of law” (to name but a 
few other examples), all exhibit the sorts of dual imprecisions in thought and language usage that 
are presented in the text.   
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and language encapsulated in the undifferentiated use of the word can be 
lessened, however, by a recognition that the term validly may convey dif-
ferent meanings in different areas of the humanities.  It is, for example, a 
term that conceptually conveys different (even if related) meanings for the 
ethicist, moral philosopher, and legal philosopher, among others.6  But it is 
also a term of common usage among non-specialists.  Taking account of the 
context in which the term is employed goes some way in reducing ambigui-
ties and in endowing the term with substantive communicative value.  My 
interest in this Paper is the application of the term in the field of interna-
tional law.  Moreover, as I shall explain below, its usage in this theatre of 
law is less descriptive than it is normative and prescriptive. 
“Dignity” may be invoked symbolically and rhetorically by one who 
feels subordinated or “put upon” as an assertion of the right to basic regard 
or show of concern from the more privileged members of society.  In this 
sense, the assertion of “dignity” simply may be intended as a statement of 
entitlement to “equal worth.”  But even used rhetorically, the term is hardly 
empty of substantive content.  While for the powerful dignity in the reflex-
ive sense may be symbolic, it is not so for the weak or the disadvantaged.7  
At its core, dignity in this context expresses an absolutist conception of the 
basic equality of all to whom the attribute attaches.  This, at any rate, is the 
position commonly associated with so-called Kantian moral philosophers 
and their cohorts in legal philosophy; namely, the proponents of “natural 
rights” and “natural law.”8  In this framework, the claim of dignity is less 
about the actual or quantifiable equality of the possessors of the attribute 
than it is about their inherent sanctity from manipulation for the benefit of 
others.  Human beings, the quintessential addressees of the attribute, are not 
and cannot be means to an end; at least, not one that is not of their own 
choosing.  They do not exist as instruments to achieve someone else’s pur-
pose.  In this sense, dignity is less about the equality of persons (although it 
may be expressive of that equality), than it is about the inviolability of the 
innate worth of each person. 
If the first conception of dignity is metaphysical in character, its sec-
ond conception is predominantly functional.  The claim here is not of the 
inherent or “innate” embeddedness of dignity in the person, but in its essen-
tiality for the characteristic performance of those activities that are distinc-
tive to the person of the possessor.  Thus, the capacity to make decisions (or 
at least those that should be entitled to respect by others) requires according 
                                                          
 6.  Cf. generally JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2008); Waldron, supra note 4. 
 7.  I shall return to this symbolic invocation of dignity towards the end of this Paper.  See 
infra Part II. 
 8.  See, e.g., Waldron supra note 4; cf. Fernando R. Tesón, The Kantian Theory of Interna-
tional Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 54 (1992) (“Liberal theory commits itself instead to normative 
individualism, to the premise that the primary normative unit is the individual, not the state.”). 
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dignity to the decisionmaker.  This attribute is at the heart of the principle 
of self-determination, and it explains the privileging of autonomy and con-
sent within a liberal legal order.9 
Professor Jeremy Waldron, a prolific writer on matters of legal philos-
ophy, has posited yet a third conceptualization of the idea of dignity.  In his 
formulation, dignity might best be understood as a trait that is associated 
with “rank.”  He notes that as a matter of etymology, “dignity” has often 
been expressed as a badge of nobility, or of offices associated with nobility.  
But dignity, he contends, is also about “rights.”10  The insight he would 
have us draw from these seemingly contradictory thrusts of “rank” and 
“equal rights” on our conception of dignity is that it is an ennobling feature 
of the human being; one that makes the human being distinctive and on a 
higher pedestal than other animals, but which leaves all human beings 
equally but distinctively endowed with rights.  Yet, as Professor Waldron 
argues, it may be that “groups,” at least under certain specified conditions, 
possess or are entitled to a claim of dignity that is independent and separate 
from the dignity of the individual members of the group.11 
But do these three conceptions of dignity share anything in common?  
It would seem evident that regardless of the framework or prism through 
which the idea of dignity is explored, one cannot stray too far from the par-
adoxical assertion of the uniqueness of the individual legal identity of each 
human person, on the one hand, and the demand for according that identity 
a homogenized treatment that is based on some conception of “equal re-
spect” to all persons alike, on the other.  The manner in which this paradox 
is reconciled tells us quite a bit about the idea of dignity.  The uniqueness of 
the individual as a legal being is advanced as both the basis and the conse-
quence of the law according and respecting her dignity.  This asserted 
uniqueness is also presented as justification for the theoretical nullification 
of hierarchically-based legal distinctions among human beings.  Further-
more, it is worth observing that although the idea of dignity typically is pre-
sented as if it were uniformly and equally applicable to all persons, the real-
ity is that the disposition of claims about dignity have practical significance 
primarily (if not exclusively) for the marginalized or disadvantaged mem-
bers (or groups of members) of a society.  The strong and the powerful may 
                                                          
 9.  In Part III, I shall take up the tension between the “natural rights” conception of dignity 
as the exclusive preserve of the individual, and the claim that I make and defend in this Paper, 
namely that the possession of dignity by the state acts to fulfill the obligation of the state to protect 
the human rights of those who claim or are entitled to its nationality. 
 10.  See WALDRON, supra note 5.  See also Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Ju-
dicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 656–57 (2008) (“The concept of 
dignitas hominis in classical Roman thought largely meant ‘status.’  Honour and respect should be 
accorded to someone who was worthy of that honour and respect because of a particular status 
that he or she had.  So, appointment to particular public offices brought with it dignitas.”).   
 11.  See Waldron, supra note 4. 
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assert interest in the theoretical meaning of dignity, but they can and do just 
as well regardless of the meaning assigned to the term.  The term thus has 
substantive significance only for the weak and disadvantaged.  It is purport-
edly in furtherance of the interest of the latter that dignity operates as a legal 
concept.  Yet, while accepting dignity as serving a functional purpose in 
mediating legal claims among human beings, for other associational rela-
tionships, it has been vigorously contested.  With these caveats in mind, let 
us next explore with some dispassion the standard teachings about “human 
dignity.” 
II.  ON THE RELATIONSHIPS OF DIGNITY AND OF RIGHTS 
Among legal philosophers, the idea of dignity is most commonly in-
voked in the context of human rights discourses.  The relationships, howev-
er, are at best under-theorized.12  One can nonetheless identify three ways in 
which the interactions may be seen to coexist.  In the first, dignity is seen as 
existing prior to human rights.  Dignity furnishes the foundation for rights.  
To assert that a person has dignity is therefore a claim that a person said to 
possess dignity is entitled to the recognition or respect of those rights that 
flow from the possession of dignity.13  Dignity in this sense is innate in the 
person.  While its recognition and acceptance should be encouraged, that 
recognition is only declaratory, not constitutive, of dignity.  Alternatively, 
the treatment of the rights (or obligations) of a person by others may be 
viewed as constitutive of dignity.  It is in the extension of rights to a person 
that society acknowledges or recognizes the possession of dignity by a per-
son.14  Rights, in this context, exist prior to dignity.  Dignity here is the sum 
total rather than the progenitor of rights.  Whether dignity is framed as a de-
claratory or as a constitutive product of its relationship to rights, that rela-
tionship is vertical.  A third possibility is that the relationship is horizontal.  
Here, dignity is simply one among many human rights.  Just as there is a 
“right” to “free speech” or to “equal treatment,” there is a “right” to “digni-
ty.”  As one among many rights, the meaning, scope and contours of dignity 
                                                          
 12. This is the uniform conclusion of many who have written on the subject.  See, e.g., Rex D. 
Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. REV. 65, 66 (2011); Neomi Rao, Three Con-
cepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 186 (2011). 
 13.  This appears to be the underlying philosophy for the positivist instruments that ground 
human rights in the “dignity” of man.  See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. 
Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Whereas recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the founda-
tion of freedom, justice and peace in the world . . . .”), http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.  In 
somewhat of a paradox, these positivist rights are in fact justified (at least in their universalist and 
“customary international law” formulations—by allusion to the natural rights grounding of human 
rights claims. 
 14.  Wittingly or otherwise, this is the implication of a good deal of current scholarship on the 
subject.  See, e.g., Glensy, supra note 12, at 65.  
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can be ascertained or framed in much the same way that those of other 
rights are framed within specified or particularized legal orders. 
Most activists, to the extent that they have given the matter any 
thought, are probably indifferent as to the relationship that best explains the 
interactions of dignity and rights.  Indeed, most probably would contend 
that the answer should be contingent on the circumstances of each case, 
with the deciding criterion being the explanation that best promotes the in-
terests of the human rights bearer.  For the advocate, what matters is that 
dignity and rights share a lot in common.  They are each possessed only by 
natural persons and distinguish their possessors from other legal persons.  
But one should find this position unsatisfactory, whether as an activist, a 
scholar or an independent observer.  Aside from the imprecision of thought 
embedded in such an articulation of the relationships between dignity and 
rights, there are philosophical and practical consequences to the one-sided 
characterization of positions that are otherwise accepted as being contin-
gent.  This is especially so in a world in which the content, if not the idea of 
rights, remains fluid and highly contested.  Let us therefore explore extant 
associations of the two concepts, and consider whether those relationships 
provide useful information on how the idea of dignity appropriately might 
be understood. 
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR” 
or “Declaration”) is uniformly accepted as the primary pillar on which cur-
rent notions and doctrines of human rights rest.  The language of the Decla-
ration suggests that dignity is the root of the tree from which individual 
claims of human rights spring.  Although the UDHR does not itself develop 
the concept of dignity, it suggests that recognition of the various asserted 
rights is essential to the full development of the human being, and that hu-
man development is an element of human dignity.15  The capacity to nurture 
one’s capabilities is thus one definition of dignity.  Similarly, to the extent 
current notions of human rights are grounded in historical precedents, the 
European Enlightenment revolutions—more particularly the French Revo-
lution—tend to be credited as providing the base of modern human rights.16  
The idea of dignity, as embraced by the European Enlightenment, presented 
it as a precursor to human rights.  Indeed, dignity was viewed in much the 
same light as earlier valued attributes (or “essences”) of “true gentleman” 
such as courage, honor, and chivalry.17  To be a “noble human being” was 
to be imbued with the characteristic of dignity.  Dignity was thus a marker 
                                                          
 15.  See Maxwell O. Chibundu, International Human Rights and the International Law Pro-
ject: The Revolving Door of Academic Discourse and Practitioner Politics, 24 MD. J. INT’L L. 
309, 312–14 (2009). 
 16.  Id. at 312 & n.3.  
 17.  See, e.g., Susanne Baer, Dignity, Liberty, Equality: A Fundamental Rights Triangle of 
Constitutionalism, 2009 U. TORONTO L.J. 417, 433–34; McCrudden, supra note 10, at 659–60.   
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of (or “placeholder” for) such ennobling and uniquely human attributes as 
respect and respectability, honor, courage, and above all else, reason.  Un-
like “rights,” dignity was not a claim of entitlement, but an assertion of 
worth. 
This seemingly shared paternity of dignity and of rights should not au-
tomatically be seen as reflecting a causal relationship between the two ide-
as, but to the extent one seeks to draw one, these histories suggest that the 
concept of dignity furnished a political underpinning for a positivist regime 
of rights.  The French Revolution, like other Enlightenment revolutions, 
marked the final transformation of feudal and monarchic societies into 
bourgeois liberal states.  While the “natural law” regime underpinning feu-
dal, monarchic or religious states had been based on concepts of “divine 
rights” and “divine justice,” the positivist laws of the liberal state looked to 
mortal beings and their institutions for its justifications and rationalizations.  
The idea of “dignity” played a significant role in the transformation of feu-
dal principalities into the modern European state system.  The political 
transformation of societies that rested on feudal, monarchic and religious 
institutions into the modern state system dominated by secular, technocratic 
and liberal values paralleled a philosophical development that asserted the 
superiority of governance by the wide swath of mortal beings, however 
flawed, over a narrow cadre of divinely appointed rulers. “Dignity,” pre-
sented as a core attribute of the mortal being, facilitated the adjustment of a 
divine authority-based conception of natural law into one that looked to 
“reason” and “morality” for its grounding in jurisprudence.  In the early 
modern state, the idea of “reason” becomes infinitely malleable, and could 
thus do the work of bridging the move from natural law to legal positivism.  
In time, as positivism gained sway, liberal societies could dispense with the 
idea of human dignity, and simply focus on the functional benefits of a rule-
based state system, of legislation and of rights. 
The nineteenth-century acceptance of legal positivism as the dominant 
philosophy of law and governance was undermined in the twentieth century 
by the excesses of corporatist and nationalist governments in the interwar 
years and the atrocities of World War II.  As had been the case in the im-
mediate aftermath of the Enlightenment revolutions, the rebuilders of the 
post-World War II order saw in the idea of dignity a humane grounding for 
the specific positivist regimes of law that they hoped would check the abus-
es of governmental power.  It is doubtful, however, that these proponents of 
rights saw dignity as an independent force or check on power.18  Where En-
                                                          
 18.  It is noteworthy that although asserted as a foundational element of the post-World War 
II human rights regime, the concept of dignity appeared to play no significant role in the liberal 
legalist discourses of such well known legal philosophers as H.L.A. Hart, Lon Fuller, or Hans 
Kelsen, and became an element of Professor Ronald Dworkin’s writings quite late in his illustri-
ous academic career.  See RONALD DWORKIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 
(2008).  Indeed, it is not a stretch to assert that it was not until the collapse (or at least imminent 
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lightenment thinkers may have genuinely believed in the idea of dignity as 
the source of reason, a half century of positivist thought had surely under-
mined such optimism.  But as positivism in the twentieth century reached 
further and further into all nooks and crannies of societal relationships, a 
counter-reaction was perhaps unavoidable.  This came in the form of reas-
sertions of the efficacy of natural law as the preferred philosophy for ex-
plaining and justifying the institutions of social governance.  The new pro-
ponents of natural law and natural rights did not directly challenge the 
substance of positivist-based rights claims, but instead suggested that the 
framing of those claims were better presented and supported by appeal to 
reason, natural rights and the dignity of the human being.  In a world in-
creasingly made smaller by the technologies of transportation, communica-
tion and information, natural law offered a Universalist perspective that 
positivism could compete with only by denying the conditions and particu-
larities of the rulemaking society.  As even positivists asserted the “univer-
sality” of rights, the need to anchor such claims in a feature or attribute that 
could be said, with some level of indisputability, to be “universal” became 
obvious.  “Dignity” was a ready-made handmaiden. 
The shared relationship between dignity and human rights thus can be 
seen as much as the product of contingent historical developments as of any 
demonstrable causal linkages.  Indeed, as Professor Waldron has contended, 
the relationship of dignity and of rights can be viewed just as readily as the 
statement of differentiated status between human beings and non-human be-
ings as it is of the absolute worth of the human being.19  Contingent as these 
relationships may be, that the idea of dignity as expressive of equality great-
ly informed the course of the French Revolution and of modern human 
rights claims cannot be doubted.  That it is an elemental component of the 
human being is simply a statement that all human beings, regardless of their 
status, social position, resource endowments or membership in the family of 
powerful groups are, at a basic level, “equal.”  To borrow from the Enlight-
enment philosophers, persons cannot and should not be viewed as objects or 
means that are subject to manipulation by others, whatever might be the 
worthiness of the ends sought to be achieved through such manipulation.  
Rather, the idea of dignity designates its possessor as a self-accomplished 
person with the potential to elevate her personality for a proper end.  This 
definition of dignity, of course, did not necessarily mean that only human 
beings are capable of existing as ends in themselves, nor that other entities 
should be subject to manipulation.  Yet current views of dignity isolate and 
treat the attribute exclusively as that of being human.  To understand why 
                                                          
collapse) of the Communist governments of Eastern Europe that dignity begins to play a signifi-
cant analytical role in legal thought within modern liberal societies. 
 19.  See WALDRON, supra note 5.  
 202 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:194 
this is so requires tracing the history of the political development of the idea 
of human rights in the post-1970s era. 
III.  RELATING THE DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS OF NATURAL PERSONS 
TO THE RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF THE STATE 
What has been said so far should make evident why it matters, both 
academically and practically, to properly situate the relationship of the idea 
of dignity to that of rights.  If dignity serves primarily as a legitimating con-
firmation for human rights, it is reasonable to ask whether that function ex-
ists (or reasonably should be expected to exist) outside the field of human 
rights.  More specifically, does imbuing the state with the attribute of “dig-
nity” act as an impediment to the promotion or enhancement of the protec-
tions afforded by human rights?  The answers to these questions transcend 
legal philosophy.  Given the continuing role of the state in shaping interna-
tional interactions, and especially in the generation and protection of posi-
tive rights, it should be evident that, to the extent dignity is in fact a legiti-
mating instrument for the distribution of rights, its applicability to the state 
remains an issue of current interest.  It is to this issue that we next turn. 
If European Enlightenment history provides a useful starting point for 
the anchoring of human rights in human dignity, it provides a no less con-
venient historical basis for exploring the linkages among the ideas of state 
dignity and of the rights of the state.20  The idea of statehood was, at its in-
ception in Europe, commonly associated with the concept of dignity.  The 
European state was a challenger and successor to the imperial and religious 
order that had first been knitted under Roman rule.  As God’s representa-
tives on Earth, the proclaimed inherent dignity of the offices of the mon-
arch, the Pope, and their viceroys was taken as a given.  That dignity was 
assumed to exist in the bourgeois (i.e., “middle-class-based”) state even 
when leadership was transferred from inherited and clerical lines to secular-
ly appointed and elected ministers.  In Enlightenment thinking, that dignity 
which had been grounded in the divinity of God’s appointed representa-
tives, was now justified by the trumpeted “sovereignty” of the people.  Just 
as dignity was said to inhere in the “personhood” of the individual, the de-
cisions of the whole of the people sanctioned the possession of dignity by 
the state. 
The dignity of the state, thus justified, was neither a mere abstraction 
nor a simple exercise of intellectual thought.  As with human beings, the 
idea of dignity furnished the grounding for the very powerful idea in inter-
national law of the existence of some minimum basic equality of status 
                                                          
 20.  As a parenthetical, one might add “responsibilities” of the state.  Indeed, as I shall argue 
below, endowing the state with dignity is especially significant in an age where it has become a 
common refrain to assert that there are no rights without responsibilities.  See infra Part IV.   
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among “sovereign states.”21  The idea of the dignity of states thus provided 
principled arguments for, among other substantial claims of the state, the 
following: the right not to be subjected to lawsuits or otherwise made ac-
countable for its decisions, even when those result in injuries to citizens, 
subjects, and non-citizens alike (i.e., the doctrine of “immunity”); the right 
to exclusive control over the regulation of activities within the state, and to 
punish wrongful conduct occurring in the state; the right of “diplomatic” 
representation on behalf of persons on whom it bestows its nationality; and 
the right to the unalloyed and uncontested loyalty of nationals.  The state 
could and did send its citizens to war in the service of asserted “national in-
terests,” and it asserted the right to organize its internal affairs in whatever 
way it saw fit, and to do so free of interference from other states.  It mat-
tered then whether an entity was deemed a state; for to be seen as such was 
to inherit the rights just enumerated.  At the heart of those rights was the 
recognized autonomy of the state as an actor, and that autonomy was un-
derpinned by the accepted (indeed revered) dignity of the state.  Not even 
the mass killings and atrocities of the two world wars of the twentieth cen-
tury (both of which were acknowledged to be rooted in the excesses of 
state-driven nationalism) undermined the veneration of the state and its 
claim to dignity. 
Indeed, the principle of self-determination was enshrined in the consti-
tutive document of the post-World War II legal order, the Charter of the 
United Nations Organization.22  Nothing in the pronouncements of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights suggested that the crafters of the decla-
ration envisioned any inconsistency in the United Nation’s Charter’s ac-
ceptance (indeed promotion) of the sovereignty and dignity of the state, on 
the one hand, and the Declaration’s “recognition of the inherent dignity and 
of the inalienable rights of all members of the human family,” on the other.  
That the rights of the individual could be secured only through the ac-
ceptance and recognition of the especial role of the state was made manifest 
in the enshrining of those rights through the positive adoption of human 
rights treaties under international law.  Those treaties obligated states to 
guarantee and extend to individuals within the territory of the state, and 
subject to the jurisdiction of the state, explicitly specified human rights.23  
International human rights did not and thus could not operate on the indi-
                                                          
 21.  For a nuanced evaluation and critique of the idea of sovereign equality, see GERRY 
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vidual except through state action, and investing the state with dignity was 
and remains essential to the state discharging its solemn and fundamental 
obligations under international law. 
Two centuries after the French Revolution, and half a century after the 
UDHR, it became quite common to decouple claims of the “dignity” and 
“rights” of the individual from those of the state.  The basic view among 
proponents of the decoupling appeared to be that the international state sys-
tem, as it had functioned during the Cold War, was antagonistic to the pro-
motion of human rights.24  By invoking the “equal sovereignty of states,” 
went the argument, repressive and “illiberal” states felt free to violate the 
human rights of their citizens, and to remain insulated from accountability 
to those citizens and to international society at large.  Denying “illiberal” 
states the legitimating concept of dignity and sovereignty, went the claim, 
would substantially promote the human rights of the citizens of those states.  
Rights, under this account, derives from the dignity of the person, and pro-
moting dignity not only ensures the protection of the individual, but ulti-
mately (as Kant was read to have contended), would ensure perpetual 
peace, at least among “democratic societies.” Divorcing the rights and dig-
nity of the individual from the claims of the state thus served two purposes.  
At the moral level, it explained the need for differentiating between these 
two claims of dignity, and at the functional level, it provided an explanation 
for a positive separation of the concepts of the human rights of the individ-
ual (a social good) from the dignity of the state (a disposable social cost). 
These arguments were aided by seemingly incontrovertible facts of the 
international order as it neared the end of the twentieth century.  In the first 
place, there could be no denying the rot in which the international system 
found itself.  A generation after the conclusion of World War II, the initial 
and admirable enthusiasm of the founders of the United Nations project for 
a world order based on saving humanity from the “scourge of war,” “faith 
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, 
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,” the 
promotion of justice under law, and of a more progressive social order,25 all 
seemed stymied by an incorrigible ideological conflict between the West 
and the East.  The swing role in that conflict was often played by the lead-
ers of the newly emerging states of the so-called “third world.”  Several 
leaders of these new states, appealing to their societies’ colonial pasts and 
histories of economic exploitations, sought to use state power—often coer-
                                                          
 24.  See, e.g., TESÓN, supra note 8, at 54 (a “liberal theory of international law” should com-
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have disadvantages for the intended beneficiaries of human rights).   
 25.  See U.N. Charter Preamble, ¶ 2. 
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cively—to rapidly make up for the economic underperformance of their 
communities.  Internally, emulating what appeared to them to be the suc-
cessful industrialization and economic policies of the Eastern Bloc, leaders 
of the new states engaged in centralized planning that often entailed intru-
sive state intervention in the private lives of their citizens.  Of particular in-
terest for the subject of this Paper were the means that they employed to 
override internal dissent.  Opponents were arbitrarily imprisoned, often de-
nied basic trial rights, and sometimes murdered outright.  Externally, many 
of these leaders, in seeming alignment with the Eastern Bloc, challenged the 
dominant international status quo which, despite the split into camps, re-
mained firmly within the grip of the much more economically and militarily 
advanced West. 
The unexpected and comprehensive collapse of the champion of the 
Eastern camp, the Soviet Union, not only validated the post-World War II 
position of the West, but also provided a new lease on life for recreating the 
international system entirely in the West’s preferred image.  Seemingly now 
offered was the opportunity for a new enlightenment era that would aggres-
sively create on the international stage the middle-class and liberal values, 
politics and economics that were only hinted at or inchoately theorized dur-
ing the formative years of classical liberalism.  This neoliberalism would 
emphasize for the international community of states those values and insti-
tutions that classical liberalism had engendered for the domestic develop-
ment of the European state system: “democracy,” “the rule of law,” “free 
markets” and of course “human rights.”  These would be promoted not 
simply as ideals of national self-governance, but also as practical working 
universal institutions for all human beings regardless of their culture or na-
tionality.  These institutions did not simply confirm the dignity and rights of 
the individual, but they were seen as essential to checking state power.  To 
do so, the state—or more accurately, the “non-liberal state”—had to be co-
erced (through shaming, if possible, but economic sanctions and military 
force, when necessary and worth the cost) into the recognition of and com-
pliance with these universal neoliberal values.  Denying that the state pos-
sessed “dignity” was seen as one argument in the quiver of neoliberalism; 
and a relatively inexpensive cost to intellectual coherence at that. 
Thus, as the twentieth century drew to its close, the international legal 
order confronted a dilemma.  On the one hand, nation-states (or more accu-
rately, the disadvantaged nation-states of the third world), relying on the 
classical liberal position of the interrelated character of autonomy, self-
determination and dignity, asserted the right to frame their national devel-
opment preferences and policies independently of their past rulers.  They 
invoked and appealed to the dignity of the state as a shield from outsiders 
questioning their chosen paths to progress and modernity.  Commentators in 
the West, enlivened by the post-Cold War triumph of the neoliberal order 
over the competing ideologies of socialism and communism, contended that 
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states, however laudatory the goal of national development might be, were 
not free to violate the human rights of their nationals, and certainly not in 
reliance on the doctrine of the dignity of the state.  And so we come to the 
crux of the current debate: are claims of the dignity of the state in fact anti-
thetical to the state’s obligation to promote human rights under international 
law?  Even if they are not, are there good reasons why the idea of dignity, at 
least as a jurisprudential concept, must be exclusively individual, or at least 
as a minimum, denied to the state? 
IV. DIGNITY AND THE STATE 
As a preliminary matter, it is not obvious why an argument of a state’s 
obligation to respect the human rights of its citizens negates a state’s claim 
to dignity.  Even if one assumes that the denial of a state’s claim to dignity 
may function as an effective “shaming” tool, it does not follow that a blan-
ket denial of dignity to the state is thereby called for.  Like any tool, its ef-
fectiveness should depend on the particulars of the problem to be solved.  If 
the last twenty-five years of the post-Cold War order teaches us anything 
about the place of human rights in the international legal order, it is that its 
violations—even egregious ones—are hardly the preserve of “illiberal” so-
cieties.  But that according dignity to the state can coexist with respect for 
human rights does not itself affirmatively explain why states are entitled to 
dignity.  It is to this affirmative claim that I now turn. 
The affirmative argument for according to states the respect that flows 
from dignity can of course seek to rest on the past.26  While the past and 
tradition cannot be discounted in matters of legal philosophy, they are to 
this writer, however, an inadequate ground on which to rest the argument.  
For one thing, today’s international legal norms do not presume the divine 
origins of law, nor in fact that the authority of law rests on some general-
ized notion of “reason” or of “morality.”  The idea of state dignity must be 
founded on less mystical—and preferably more practical—considerations.  
Ideas of the equality of states, of respect for the decisions of a state arrived 
at through the internally generated self-determination processes of that 
state, and of the autonomy of a people to make decisions free from the co-
ercive influences of others, all argue in favor of the acceptance of the digni-
ty of the state, just as readily as they do for recognizing and cherishing the 
dignity of the individual human person.  These arguments can of course be 
framed as essentially derivative; that is, they may represent the aggregation 
in the state of the reasons for according dignity to the individual.  If a state 
affords an efficient mechanism for aggregating the values and interests that 
inhere in the dignity of the individual that may well be a sufficient reason, 
but I think more can be said in favor of viewing the dignity of the state as 
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distinct from the aggregation of the dignity of its citizens, officials and resi-
dents.27 
Most crucial for according dignity to the state is the necessity to rec-
ognize and buttress the authority of the state to act responsibly on behalf of 
its nationals.  Regardless of utopian assertions about the shared solidarity of 
humankind, it requires an unacceptably obtuse level of unrealism to ignore 
the continuing and vital role that states play in shaping the life chances of 
each and every person on the globe.  Whether one wishes it or not, where 
one is born, or the society into whose membership one is admitted, is per-
haps the most significant right that is possessed by any person.  This factor, 
more than any other, determines the individual’s educational opportunities, 
right to health care, shelter, travel, access to the legal system, and capacity 
to influence the society’s governance, prosperity and overall welfare.  For 
any given individual, these rights are not abstractions, and they can rarely 
be shaped other than by the collective interactions of those who are mem-
bers of the political community that is the state.  Neither the individual, nor 
outsiders, however well-meaning their intentions, can significantly deter-
mine the welfare either of the individual or of the polity independently of 
the state of one’s nationality.  Statehood is thus a uniquely shared enterprise 
of its members.  The authority of the state to discharge the responsibilities 
that are thereby imposed on it depends in no small measure on the recogni-
tion and acceptance of its status; and inherent in that status is that the state 
possesses a vital and distinctive personality, one that confers on it no lesser 
personality than that which inheres in the personality of other states.  The 
respect that flows from that recognition, the acceptance of the equal and 
validated worth of the state, and above all, the shared sense by the members 
of the political community of that basic acceptance constitute, at their core, 
the idea of dignity. 
Instinctively, the argument against according dignity to the state seems 
supportable on the ground that since its legal personality is based on a “fic-
tion,” it is necessarily artificial.  This assumes of course that dignity can on-
ly attach to natural persons.  Like most instinctive arguments, it embodies 
some tautology.  We might break out of that tautology by pointing out that 
conferring legal personality on the state does not and need not necessarily 
make it less of an artificial creation.  States may represent practical realities, 
or “facts on the ground,” and may well precede the creation of law.  If the 
state is a subject of legal rules, there is no obvious reason why its compli-
ance with those rules cannot or should not be backed up by the validation 
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that dignity confers.  In any event, while several modern states are indisput-
ably products of arbitrary and sometimes whimsical decisionmaking, it is 
equally the case that even those states (as virtually all nation states) strive to 
become organic entities.  They seek to inculcate in their citizens strong 
bonds and affinities that transcend the merely utilitarian.  In this, they are 
aided by the exclusive identification of other states with their nationals.   
Whatever may be the rhetoric of “our common humanity,” the reality 
is that most contemporary human beings have national states of primary al-
legiance.  They respond affectively to the claims of the state, showing pride 
when it succeeds, and feeling disconsolate when it fails.  This reflexive rela-
tionship often means that the identity of the individual, her status, and her 
dignity may be closely intertwined with that of the state, but it also suggests 
that far from the state deriving its identity from the aggregation of the rights 
and interests of its citizens, it is in fact the citizen who derives—at least in 
part—her identity and welfare from the state.  It is the dignity of the state 
that confers respect for the individual, rather than the other way around.  Of 
course, the two may never be distinguishable entirely, but may actually 
function in a reinforcing relationship; but the point is that a state’s claim to 
worth, to equal respect, or even to a high rank among the groups of states is 
not simply the product of the entitlement of individual citizens, or even the 
collective aggregation of those entitlements, but reflects the accrued and in-
dependent identity of the state.  In a real sense, then, the personality of the 
state is a living, changing and organic item.  A state acquires a readily con-
figurable identity, and dignity functions to accord some breathing space for 
the organization, manipulation and reorganization of that identity. 
What has been said about the creation of the identity of the individual, 
as in part, a product of her affiliation to the state can of course just as readi-
ly be said about the identity of the state as the aggregation and, ultimately, 
fusion of the sovereignties of the individuals who comprise the state.  To 
deny that the state has dignity may thus amount in no small measure to the 
diminution of the claim of the dignity possessed by the individual mem-
bers—citizens, nationals or residents—of the state.  Indeed, this is one of 
the real consequences of the current world order in which, despite claims of 
the inherent dignity of all persons, an individual’s nationality has been of-
fered up as legal justification (or lack of such justification) for extra-judicial 
killings, indefinite detentions, and similar governmental actions in which, 
ordinarily, one’s nationality would not have been thought to be relevant to 
the privilege, immunity or disability of the individual. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The broad topic of this Constitutional Law Schmooze is on “The Pub-
lic and the Private.”  In the legal academy, the phrase is most commonly 
deployed in the context of specifying spheres of the operation of the legal 
 2015] THE CASE OF THE STATE 209 
rules that apportion rights and responsibilities.28  The traditional view that 
there were in fact bastions in which public rules reigned supreme, and those 
in which private relationships and attachments were insulated from scruti-
ny, has in recent years been shown to be at best unintelligible, and at worst, 
misleadingly destructive of a society’s governance structures and social re-
lationships.  How well these criticisms can or will withstand today’s intru-
sive technologies of surveillance and communication may properly be 
doubted, but what can hardly be disputed is that the effort by human rights 
proponents to disparage the idea that dignity may be as intrinsic to the iden-
tity and person of the state as it is to the individual is demonstrably in oppo-
sition to the liberal ethos that supposedly underpins human rights norms.  
Remarkably, then, while domestic law proponents of neoliberalism argued 
for breaking down the dichotomy of the public and the private, they insist-
ed, even as they relied on natural law doctrines to promote the human rights 
of the individual, that as public entities, states were not endowed with cer-
tain attributes that are said to be quintessentially private in nature.  Dignity 
was posited as one such attribute.  But whatever may be the satisfaction of 
slapping down those states that we deem to be “illiberal,” is it really the 
case that the attribute of dignity should be viewed as alien to their legal per-
sonality?  Marxist analysis was flawed in anticipating a utopia in which the 
state withered away.  Neoliberalism is no less mistaken when it posits the 
atavistic individual whose claim for dignity can be respected independently 
of those ties and affiliations that nationality and statehood confer on him 
and her. 
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